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The Political Influences on Effective
Treatymaking in America's Backyard:
The Guatemala Peace Plan - A Case
Study
The importance of the Central American region to the United
States would appear so obvious as to be unworthy of argument. The
physical proximity of the nations of the region to our own borders,
and the parlous state of the Mexican economy and political struc-
ture combine to draw Washington's attention southward.
Unfortunately, agreement on the centrality of a region to U.S.
foreign policy does not produce political consensus on the substance
of that policy. In fact, disputes over U.S. policy towards El Salva-
dor and Nicaragua have proved some of the most divisive of the
Reagan Administration.
This controversy was not quieted by the signing of the Guate-
mala Peace Treaty. In fact, this accord may have further compli-
cated the already perplexing task of formulating U.S. policy to-
wards the region. On the one hand, the plan's chief proponent,
President Oscar Arias has held out the prospect of political democ-
ratization and stabilization for the region. Washington views such
developments as both morally desirable and compatible with its na-
tional security interests. On the other hand, the plan is remarkably
vague as to how this final end is to be achieved. The early stages of
the peace plan provide for the negotiation of ceasefires but, while
they provide for a cut-off of external assistance to guerrilla forces,
make no similar proviso for governments in situ. Under these cir-
cumstances, one must ask why governments would grant political
concessions to anti-government forces once the main pressure to do
so had been removed.
The plan's bias towards existing governments already has
caused El Salvador's FMLN forces to reject the plan out of hand.
The Sandinista government in Managua has made some prelimi-
nary moves towards opening up domestic dissent but then mobilized
Sandinista turbas to quash public expressions of dissent with mob
violence. Meanwhile, the Sandinista negotiators are refusing to dis-
cuss with the contra representatives any plans for the long term de-
mocratization of Nicaraguan political life.
Clearly, the achievement of peace in Central America will
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prove an exceedingly difficult task. I am sure that we all wish the
Guatemala Peace Plan well. If success can be achieved in these
most difficult circumstances L for one, will not cavil.
Foreward by Senator William V. Roth, Jr.*
* Republican, Delaware. Member, Governmental Affairs, Finance, Joint Economic, Joint
Committee on Taxation, and Select Committee on Intelligence Committees.
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GUATEMALA PEACE PLAN
I just don't think that a sheet of paper is going to change
Marxists into Democrats.1
I. Introduction
Senator Holling's position on the likelihood of obtaining an en-
during peace in Central America through the creation of a treaty is
indicative of the this region of the world. Despite this back-drop of
doubt, the President of Costa Rica, Oscar Arias Sanchez, is commit-
ted to gaining a lasting peace for the area. Along with the leaders of
five other Central American countries, Arias-Sanchez spearheaded
the drafting and implementation of a treaty designed to facilitate
peace in Central America.' This treaty is known as the "Guatemala
Peace Plan." Nicaragua, a signatory, as well as other countries, has
repeatedly refused to agree to the terms of other treaties composed
by the Contadora Group.4 The Guatemala Peace Treaty marks a
breakthrough that will affect not only the political and social infra-
structures of the signatory states, but also the economic and security
interests of the United States as well.
This Comment briefly analyzes the treaties that have been pro-
posed for the establishing democracy and laying a foundation for a
lasting peace in the Central America region. Among the plans ini-
tially reviewed are the Contadora Plan,6 the Guatemala Plan and the
Reagan-Wright Plan. Next, the goals and objectives of the Reagan
Administration and the United States Congress in the region are
then outlined. The role of the Contras7 to further these goals, and
the legal implications of funding the Contras, are examined. The
Guatemala Peace Plan is then given in-depth treatment. In particu-
lar, the democratization provisions are studied, in light of the Nica-
raguan Constitution and the Interior Ministry. Finally, recommenda-
tions are made for the drafting of a comprehensive treaty in Central
I. N.Y. Times, August 7, 1987, at A10, col. 10 (quoting Senator Ernest Hollings (D-
S.C.) in response to question about Guatemala Peace Plan).
2. The Treaty was signed on April 7, 1987, by the following Presidents: Oscar Arias
Sanchez, Costa Rica; Jose Azcano Hoyo, Honduras; Vinicio Cerezo Arevalo, Guatemala; Jose
Napoleon Duarte, El Salvador; and Daniel Ortega Saavedra, Nicaragua.
3. See infra App. A for full text.
4. SERAFINO, THE CONTADORA INITIATIVE: IMPLICATIONS FOR CONGRESS I (Congres-
sional Research Service Issue Brief 85109, 1987) [hereinafter CONTADORA ISSUE BRIEF]. The
Contadora process was started in 1983 and five different treaties have been proposed, the most
recent one in 1986. Id. at 2.
5. Procedure for Establishing Firm and Lasting Peace in Central America, Aug. 7,
1987, Costa Rica-Guatemala-Honduras-El Salvador-Nicaragua [hereinafter Guatemala Plan].
See infra App. A (text provided by Costa Rican embassy). See also N.Y. Times, Aug. 12,
1987, at A8, col. 1, 133 CONG. REC. S3077-79 (daily ed. March 12, 1987) (text of tentative
draft and remarks of Senator Wallop).
6. See CONTADORA ISSUE BRIEF, supra note 4, at 1; Roberts, Reagan Reports 'General'
Accord on Latin Proposal, N.Y. Times, Aug. 6, 1987, at A15, col. 1.
7. The Contras are the military force hired to oppose the Sandinista government.
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America, and more specifically, in Nicaragua, that would satisfacto-
rily include within its provisions the interests of all states. This Com-
ment asserts that any peace treaty involving the countries in the
United States' backyard will be ineffective unless it comports with
the interests of the United States and sufficiently changes the politi-
cal structure of the Nicaraguan communist government to meet
those concerns.
II. An Overview of the Peace Process in Central America: Reach-
ing An Agreement
A. The Contadora Initiative
On August 7, 1987, the presidents of Guatemala, Honduras, El
Salvador, Costa Rica, and Nicaragua, signed a regional peace agree-
ment in Guatemala City.8 Signing this peace treaty marked the cul-
mination of several years of negotiations among the Central Ameri-
can governments on various peace initiatives. The peace process,
however, began in 1983, when the Contadora Group9 began attempts
to negotiate a comprehensive peace agreement among the Central
American countries. 10 The Contadora Group produced a Document
of Objectives listing twenty-one points essential to a lasting peace."1
The objectives included termination of all military hostilities, reduc-
tion in foreign advisers, and elimination of support for guerrillas, as
well as the end of all dialogue between insurgents and the govern-
ments they oppose. These accomplishments were to lead to open,
participatory democratic processes. 2 In 1986, the Contadora Group
presented a revised draft to the Central American countries.'- Under
pressure from the United States, an opponent to the draft,' " repre-
sentatives of Costa Rica, El Salvador, and Honduras rejected the
proposed draft.' The provisions regarding the implementation of
8. N.Y. Times, Aug. 12, 1987, at Al, col. 4.
9. Four Latin American countries, Columbia, Mexico, Panama, and Venezuela comprise
the Contadora group. See CONTRADORA ISSUE BRIEF, supra note 4, at 1.
10. CONTADORA ISSUE BRIEF, supra note 4, at 2-3.
11. Contadora Document of Objectives, in OFFICE OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY FOR LATIN
AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN, Dept. of State, Pub. No. 9551, NEGOTIATIONS IN CENTRAL
AMERICA 1981-1987 21-23 (rev. ed. 1987) [hereinafter Contadora Document of Objectives].
12. BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPr. OF STATE SPECIAL REPORT No. 148, THE
U.S. AND CENTRAL AMERICA: IMPLEMENTING THE NATIONAL BIPARTISAN COMMISSION RE-
PORT 23 (1986) [hereianfter SPECIAL REPORT]. Some of the other 21 objectives include elimi-
nation of arms traffic, cessation of the use of any nation's own territory for governmental
destabilization in another country, continuation of humanitarian aid, and negotiation of financ-
ing. See Contadora Document of Objectives, supra note 11, at 22-23.
13. CONTADORA ISSUE BRIEF, supra note 4, at 4.
14. Christian Sci. Mon., May 11, 1987, at 2, col. 3. See generally CONTADORA ISSUE
BRIEF, supra note 4, at 4.
15. CONTADORA ISSUE BRIEF, supra note 4, at 4. There were indications that Costa Rica
and Honduras refused to negotiate so long as Nicaragua still had suits pending against them in
the World Court. Id.
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democratic rule, the freezing on arms imports, the ending of military
maneuvers, the dismantling of foreign military bases, and the verify-
ing of security were considered too vague and thus unacceptable. 6
With negotiations at an impasse, other agreements surfaced.
B. The Guatemala Plan
In August 1987, the leaders of Guatemala, Honduras, El Salva-
dor, Costa Rica, and Nicaragua forged an independent agreement.' 7
Formally entitled the "Procedure for Establishing a Stable Peace in
Central America," the Guatemala Plan includes among its provi-
sions the requirement that cease-fire agreements be concluded to end
hostilities in the Central American countries engaged in guerrilla
wars.18 In addition,' 9 the nations are required to initiate democratic
participatory processes, and provide reconciliation schemes to inte-
grate anti-government forces into these processesY° Moreover, civil
liberties, including free elections and free press are to be guaran-
teed2' and support for both foreign and domestic military and insur-
gent guerrilla forces is to be suspended.22 An international commis-
sion is responsible to oversee the implementation of and compliance
with the plan.2
C. Reagan-Wright Plan
Two days before the Central American Presidents signed the
Guatemala Plan, the United States24 proposed a treaty intended to
establish peace in Nicaragua. 5 The Reagan-Wright Plan first calls
16. SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 12 at 23.
17. See infra App. A (Guatemala Plan text).
18. See infra App. A at § 2. The provision is entitled "Exhortation for the Cessation of
Hostilities," and reads: "The governments strongly urge the countries in the area that are now
undergoing attacks by irregular or insurgent groups to agree to ceasing hostilities." id.
19. The plan's provisions were to take effect on November 7, 1987. Id. at § 11. The
November 7 deadline has since been extended. Wash. Post, Nov. 6, 1987, at A30, col. 1.
20. See infra App. A at § 1. The provision is entitled "National Reconciliation." Recon-
ciliation, as framed by the Guatemala Plan, consists of a process of dialogue with opposing
groups, amnesty for opposing groups, and the creation of a National Commission of Reconcili-
ation for verification purposes. Id.
21. Id. at § 4. This provision is entitled "Free Elections," and states that "[h]aving
established the conditions inherent in any democracy, there shall be free, pluralistic and honest
elections." Id.
22. Id. at § 5. The provision is entitled "Cessation of Assistance to Irregular Forces or to
Insurrectional Movements," and provides that "[t]he Governments of the five Central Ameri-
can States shall request" the Governments providing military support to guerrilla forces "to
cease such assistance." Id.
23. Id. at § 10. The provision is entitled "International Commission for Verification and
Follow-up," and states that the Commission "shall be ... composed of the Secretary Generals
...of the Organization of American States and the United Nations, and the Ministers of
Foreign Affairs of Central America, the Contadora Group and the Support Group." Id.
24. The Reagan Administration announced the proposal which was jointly developed by
Speaker of the House Jim Wright (D-Tex.).
25. The Reagan-Wright Peace Plan, in OFFICE OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY FOR LATIN
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for an immediate cease-fire. If such a cease-fire is effectuated, then
the United States must suspend military aid to the U.S.-backed free-
dom fighter force and the Soviet-bloc military must cease its aid to
the Sandinista Government." The Reagan-Wright Plan also estab-
lishes a plan of reconciliation and dialogue among Nicaraguan citi-
zens, including amnesty and equal participation in the political
processes for the insurgents."7 A scheme of expanded trade and long-
range economic assistance for the democratic governments of Cen-
tral America, including the Nicaraguan Government if it democra-
tizes, is also provided. 8
D. Comparison of Guatemala Plan with Reagan-Wright Plan
The two peace treaties differ in scope, timing and the role of
external powers.2 9 The Guatemala Plan is regional in scope, whereas
the Reagan-Wright Plan focuses only on Nicaragua.30 The Guate-
mala Plan requires that the cease-fires, the implementation of the
democratization processes, and the cut-off of military aid to anti-
government forces be accomplished by November 7, 1987. The Rea-
gan-Wright Plan, however, calls for the implementation of these
same measures by September 30, 1987.31 Despite this similarity in
timing, the Guatemala Plan does not address the issue of foreign
military aid to the governments of Central America. 2 Under the
Reagan-Wright Plan, however, United States aid to the freedom
fighters, and Soviet-bloc aid to the Sandinista Government must be
discontinued.33
Although the United States, as well as the Soviet Union and
Cuba, were not initially involved in the Contadora process, the Con-
tadora countries recognized that these countries were protagonists in
AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN NEGOTIATIONS IN CENTRAL AMERICA, U.S. DEP'T. OF STATE
PUB. No. 9551, 1981-1987 14-15 [hereinafter Reagan-Wright Plan]. See also SERAFINO, THE
CENTRAL AMERICAN PEACE AGREEMENT: ISSUES FOR CONGRESS, 6 (CONGRESSIONAL RE-
SEARCH SERVICE ISSUE BRIEF 87200, 1987) [hereinafter CENTRAL AMERICAN ISSUE BRIEF];
133 CONG. REC. E3267 (daily ed. Aug. 5, 1987) (text of Reagan-Wright Plan).
26. See infra App. B (Reagan-Wright Plan text). Proposal 1 of the plan states that
when a "cease-fire is in place, the United States will immediately suspend all military aid to
the Contras, and, simultaneously, Nicaragua will stop receiving aid from Cuba, the Soviet
Union, and the Communist Bloc countries." Id.
27. Id. at proposal 4.
28. Id. at proposal 5. The provision reads: "A plan of expanded trade and long-range
economic assistance for the democratic governments of Central America in which Nicaragua
might participate." Id.
29. CENTRAL AMERICAN ISSUE BRIEF, supra rote 25, at 6.
30. Id. It has been stated that the focus of the Guatemala Plan is on Nicaragua. Id. at
3. See also LeMoyne, Latin Hope and Evasion, N.Y. Times, Aug. 10, 1987, at Al, col. 4.
31. CENTRAL AMERICAN ISSUE BRIEF, supra note 25, at 6. See also infra App. B at
proposal 6. The Reagan-Wright Plan states that "[t]he negotiating process shall commence
immediately and be completed by September 30, 1987." Id.
32. CENTRAL AMERICAN ISSUE BRIEF, supra note 25, at 6.
33. See infra App. B at proposal 1.
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the Central American conflict and would have to support any final
accord if it were to last. 4 As an example, the Contadora process has
stalled, in part because the United States pressured some of the
American backed countries-Costa Rica, El Salvador, and Hondu-
ras-to find the treaties unacceptable.8 5 Even with the current stale-
mate of the Contadora process and the recognition of legitimate for-
eign interest in Central American politics, the President of Costa
Rica has stated his desire for the countries to work out a peace by
themselves.36 The Guatemala Plan is a realization of this hope. The
United States, however, has a legitimate foreign policy interest in
the region and Central American countries know that the effective-
ness of any treaty depends greatly on United States' approval.3"
III. The United States Perspective: Policy Objectives in Nicaragua
A. Historical Background
On July 17, 1979, a broad based coalition forced the resignation
of Nicaraguan dictator Anastasio Somoza.38 Shortly thereafter, the
leftist guerrilla army that had organized armed revolts throughout
Nicaragua, the Frente Sandinista de Liberacion Nacional (FSLN),
established its dominance in the executive junta (ruling party), the
cabinet, and the legislative Council of State.39 On the second anni-
versary of the revolution, the government, now led by junta member
Daniel Ortega, announced the postponement of elections until
1985.0
The United States' initial response to the overthrow of the op-
pressive Somoza regime in 1979 was to support the new Sandinista
Government." The United States provided aid to Nicaragua imme-
diately following the 1979 revolution. During the first eighteen
months of Sandinista rule, the United States contributed 118 million
34. CONTADORA ISSUE BRIEF, supra note 4, at 3. The author states: "Contadora coun-
tries recognized that all [United States, Soviet Union, and Cuba] were protagonists in the
Central American conflicts and would have to support any final accord if it were to last." Id.
35. Id.
36. Christian Sci. Mon., May 11, 1987, at 2 col. 3. See also St. Louis Post Dispatch,
Aug. 6, 1987, at 2C (editorial).
37. Roberts, Reagan Planning to Seek More Aid for the Contras, N.Y. Times, Aug. 14,
1987, at A8, col. 4. See also Address to Congress by President Oscar Arias (Sept. 22, 1987).
Referring to the Guatemala Plan, President Arias stated: "With the help of the United States
we hope to exchange threats of war for opportunities of peace." Id.
38. SERAFINO, NICARAGUA: CONDITIONS AND ISSUES FOR U.S. POLICY, 1, 2 (CONGRES-
SIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE ISSUE BRIEF 82115, 1987) [hereinafter NICARAGUA ISSUE BRIEF].
See also E. HOYT, LAW AND FORCE IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 137 (1985).
39. NICARAGUA ISSUE BRIEF, supra note 38, at 2, 3. Even this early in Sandinista rule
the Roman Catholic Church and Amnesty International claimed that the government was
moving toward a totalitarian state. Id.
40. Id. at 2.
41. See generally E. HOYT, supra note 38, at 138.
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dollars toward Nicaragua's development efforts."2 Subsequently, the
revolution became more radical and when the Sandinista Govern-
ment began supporting communist guerrillas in El Salvador in late
1980, all aid was suspended.' s
B. Goals of the Reagan Administration
Upon taking office in 1981, the Reagan Administration formu-
lated a policy in Central America which rested on the premise that
dominance by communists would lead to the elimination of political
opposition, the alignment of Nicaragua with the Soviet Union and
Cuba, and the spread of communism throughout Central America."
The Reagan Administration stated that the expansion of commu-
nism was evidenced by the increased amount of Soviet aid, and the
ever-increasing repression of civil liberties and dissent.'"
The Reagan Administration's policy reflects the view that the
Soviet Union must not be permitted to "add a strategic hold on the
mainland to their position in Cuba,""' primarily because the Admin-
istration believes that communism cannot "bring freedom or prosper-
ity to Central America.""' According to this Administration, the ori-
gins of this regional crisis are "largely the result of internal conflict
in Nicaragua, a conflict produced by the Sandinistas' denial of free-
dom and their relentless efforts to consolidate repressive Marxist-
Leninist dictatorship aligned with Cuba and the Soviet-bloc."'' 8
42. OFFICE OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY FOR LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN, U.S.
DEP'T OF STATE, PUB. No. 9554, SOVIET BLOCK ASSISTANCE TO CUBA AND NICARAGUA VER-
sus U.S. ASSISTANCE TO CENTRAL AMERICA 4 (1987) [hereinafter SOVIET ASSISTANCE DIs-
PATCH). Within weeks of the Sandinista victory, U.S. aircraft arrived with food and medicine.
The United States also supported the flow of $1.6 billion from international financial institu-
tions. Id.
43. Id. at 4. See generally E. HOYT, supra note 38, at 139; NICARAGUA ISSUE BRIEF,
supra note 38, at 6. The Carter Administration informally suspended aid in late 1980 when
the revolution "radicalized." Id.
44. NICARAGUA ISSUE BRIEF, supra note 38, at 6.
45. Id. See also SOVIET ASSISTANCE DISPATCH, supra note 42, at 4. In December 1987,
Roger Miranda Bengechea, who was a top aide to Defense Minister Humberto Ortega (Presi-
dent Ortega's brother), defected to the United States, and told American officials that the
Soviet Union was preparing to send large amounts of new weaponry to the Nicaraguans. Kin-
zer, Soviet is Aiding Nicaragua in Buildup Defector Says, N.Y. Times, Dec. 14, 1987, at AI,
col. 3. Defense Minister Ortega affirmed the planned buildup. Id.
Soviet economic aid totalled $1.83 billion since 1979, and Soviet military aid totalled
$1.81 billion since 1980. NICARAGUA ISSUE BRIEF, supra note 38, at 4. The Soviet bloc has
supplied nearly all of the Sandinista arsenal, including 12 gunships, 35 helicopters, 110 tanks,
and hundreds of missiles. Id. at 5. See also SOVIET ASSISTANCE DISPATCH, supra note 42, at 2.
Nicaragua apparently receives more than 90% of its military assistance from the Soviet Union
and East European countries. The Soviet supply of military hardware to Nicaragua has in-
creased by 15,000 metric tons since January 1987. Id.
46. Hearings Before the Senate Foreign Relations Comm., 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (Sept.
10, 1987) (statement of Secretary of State George Schultz) [hereinafter Statement of Secre-
tary Schultz].
47. Id.
48. Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 100th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1987) (statement of Elliott Abrams, U.S. Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs).
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The United States views Nicaragua as an anomaly and a
threatening force in a region that is predominantly based on demo-
cratic principles.4 9 Thus, the natural solution to the regional crisis
caused by Nicaragua, is the democratization of the "odd man out."
The President of the United States has stated that he would support
Central Americans who are willing to work for, and, if necessary,
fight for a democratic nation.50
C. Congressional Objectives
Similar to the Reagan Administration, the United States Con-
gress has also expressed the desire that the region be completely
democratic. In large part, Congress has followed the recommenda-
tions of the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America
which encouraged the United States to further democracy by urging
a diplomatic settlement in the region that would be "comprehensive
and verifiable, using economic assistance as an inducement and the
threat of military force as a penalty for failure."51 The Commission
has suggested that such a settlement would be based on the twenty-
one objectives accepted by the Central American States at the re-
quest of the Contadora Group.52
To implement this strategy, Congress has enacted laws that as-
sist in the achievement of democracy in the region.53 The Contras
are the United States force that are used to compel a democratic
solution for the region. These broad statutes provide the United
States with necessary military assistance if such assistance to the
Contras will support peace that is based on the "objectives of
democratization.
'" 4
"We seek a good agreement, one that will achieve a just and durable peace and bring democ-
racy to all . I..." Id.
49. Statement of Secretary Schultz, supra note 46. Schultz stated that Costa Rica, El
Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala "have freely elected governments that are offering their
people the chance for a better future . . . . [T]he blatant exception to the new democratic tide
is Nicaragua." Id.
50. Id.
51. K. STORRS, KISSINGER COMMISSION IMPLEMENTATION: ACTION BY THE CONGRESS
THROUGH 1987 ON THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE NATIONAL BIPARTISAN COMMISSION ON
CENTRAL AMERICA, 19-22 (Congressional Research Service Report No. 87-291 F, 1987). The
author characterized this approach as the "carrot and stick" approach. Id. at 20.
52. Id. See also Contadora Document of Objectives, supra note 11, at 21.
53. See STORRS, supra note 51, at 20.
54. 22 U.S.C.A. §§ 2271, 2273 (West Supp. 1985). 22 U.S.C.A. § 2271(a) reads, in
pertinent part: "The Congress finds that (1) the building of democracy ... [is] important to
the interests of the United States. ... This section continues stating: "The achievement of
democracy, [and] respect for human rights . . . depends primarily on . . . the people and
governments of Central America," but recognizes that the United States can make a signifi-
cant contribution to such democratic developments. Id.
22 U.S.C.A. § 2273(2) reads, in pertinent part: "The Congress ... finds that the United
States should provide such assistance and support as many be appropriate in helping to reach
comprehensive and verifiable final agreements, based on the Document of Objectives, which
will ensure peaceful and enduring solutions to the Central American conflicts." Id.
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D. Role of the Contras
Both Congress and the Reagan Administration seek to achieve
democracy in Central America, although they have disagreed on the
means to accomplish those objectives. From 1981 to 1986, Congress
approved $189 million in covert and overt funding for the Contras."
There was a cut-off of aid in 1984, followed by an appropriation of
$27 million for "non-lethal" purposes and then a resumption of mili-
tary aid in the fall of 1986.56 According to the Reagan Administra-
tion and the U.S. Congress, the three purposes of the anti-Sandinista
guerrillas are: 1) to end Nicaraguan support for anti-government
communist Salvadoran guerrillas; and 2) to induce the Sandinista
government to institute domestic reforms that would lead to a more
pluralistic and democratic Nicaraguan society; and 3) to pressure
the Sandinista Government to negotiate agreements that reflect
United States concerns, such as the communist expansion in Central
America. 7 The Reagan Administration and supporters have stated
that the United States-backed anti-Sandinista resistance has caused
a serious erosion of the Sandinista support base in the region, and
has therefore disrupted the economy.5 8 These pressures, they claim,
have forced the Sandinistas to make difficult, internal domestic
changes. 9 United States supporters of the anti-Sandinista freedom
fighters believe that the funding has been important in compelling
the Sandinistas to negotiate seriously. 0 These supporters argue that
55. N. SERAFINO, U.S. ASSISTANCE TO NICARAGUAN GUERRILLAS: Issues for the Con-
gress 1-3 (CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE ISSUE BRIEF 84139, 1987) [hereinafter U.S.
ASSISTANCE ISSUE BRIEF]. A "contra" is a guerrilla, insurgent, irregular, anti-government
force. President Reagan commonly refers to them as "freedom fighters."
56. STORRS, supra note 51, at 20. In 1981, Congress approved $19 million of covert
military assistance to anti-Sandinista guerrillas (contras); in 1983, $23 million was appropri-
ated; in 1984, amid reports of mining of Nicaraguan ports and a misuse of funds, aid was
suspended; in 1985, $27 million of "non-lethal," food, medicine, etc., was approved; and in
1986, $100 million in military and non-lethal aid was appropriated. N. SERAFINO, CONTRA
AID: 1981-MARCH 1987 at 1-2 (Congressional Research Service Report No. 87-65F, 1987).
Despite these amounts, for every dollar of United States aid to the entire Central American
region, Nicaragua and Cuba get the equivalent of $10 from the Soviets. SOVIET ASSISTANCE
DISPATCH, supra note 42, at 1. On February 3, 1988, the U.S. House of Representatives re-
jected an Administration backed resolution that would have provided at least $43 million in
aid, including $3.6 million in military aid, to the contras over the next four months. LeMoyne,
Contra Leaders Assail House Vote; Vow to Press On, N.Y. Times, Feb. 5, 1988, at AI, col. 1.;
Brinkley, White House Seeks 36 Million in Aid for Contras, N.Y. Times, Jan. 27, 1988, at
Al, col. 6.
57. U.S. ASSISTANCE ISSUE BRIEF, supra note 55, at 5.
58. Id. at 6, 7. The war effort costs the Sandinista Government 40%-50% of the annual
budget. Additionally, the Nicaraguan Government claims that the contras' "economic sabo-
tage" has cost Nicaragua close to $13 billion. Id. at 7.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 8. The Reagan administration argues that "the funding of the anti-Sandinista
guerrillas will pressure the Nicaraguan Government to negotiate seriously on matters of con-
cern to the United States." Id. A contra director recently responded to the February cutoff of
aid by Congress, stating: "Soviet and Cuban aid still flows to the Sandinista regime and the
democratic resistance must now go to the negotiating table in a very weakened position." Le-
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a fear of invasion by the United States itself, demonstrated by seri-
ous support for the freedom fighters, has provided an even greater
impetus for Nicaragua to negotiate on terms reflecting United States
concerns.
61
Opponents of funding argue that continued military aid will
provoke a further escalation of conflict in Nicaragua and in Central
America that might lead to direct United States military action.62 In
addition, these opponents argue that the freedom fighters have real-
ized little military success, and moreover, have not established a via-
ble political alternative to Sandinista rule.6 3 The opponents of fund-
ing also see economic sanctions, such as trade embargoes and quotas,
and a blocking of loans from Western institutions, as the acceptable
means to effect change in the region.6 4 The International Court of
Justice's holding that the United States' funding of the Contras is
violative of international law, lends credence to the opponents call
for the termination of aid.6"
1. Legal Implications: Nicaragua v. United States.-The le-
gality of the United States' funding of the Contras was recently ad-
dressed by the International Court of Justice in Nicaragua v. United
States.6 Nicaragua petitioned the Court to resolve a dispute over
responsibility for military and paramilitary activities in and against
Nicaragua. Nicaragua contended that the United States, or agencies
thereof, were mining Nicaraguan ports and waters without issuing
public and official warning to international shippers.17 In addition,
Nicaragua complained that United States aircraft were infringing its
airspace. 8 More importantly, Nicaragua claimed that the United
States "created" the Contra force, and provided direct combat sup-
port for its military operations.6 9 Finally, Nicaragua contended that
the United States trade embargo, the blocking of loans to Nicaragua
by the United States, and the reduction of sugar import quotas, were
economic measures taken against it by the United States to interfere
Moyne, supra note 56 at Al, col. 1.
61. U.S. ASSISTANCE ISSUE BRIEF, supra note 55, at 8.
62. Id. at 13.
63. Id. at 4. There is some indication that the Contra political situation was bettered by
the reconstitution in mid-May of the Nicaraguan Resistance, with Adolfo Calero and Alfonso
Robelo being elected to the new directorate. Id. See also LeMoyne, Rebel Leader Says Sup-
port is Waning, N.Y. Times, Sept. 7, 1987, at A5, col. 1.
64. NICARAGUA ISSUE BRIEF, supra note 38, at 6. See also Nordland, Managua's
Wounded Economy, NEWSWEEK, June 22, 1987, at 35.
65. U.S. ASSISTANCE ISSUE BRIEF, supra note 55, at 10.
66. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),
1985-1986 I.C.J.Y.B. 137 (1986).
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in the internal affairs of Nicaragua. 0
In its defense, the United States asserted that Nicaragua was
"actively supporting armed groups operating in certain of its neigh-
boring countries," especially in El Salvador, through the supplying of
arms. 71 The United States further maintained that Nicaragua was
responsible for cross-border military attacks on Honduras and Costa
Rica. 72 The United States also argued that Nicaragua had violated
its own assurances, made in 1979, that it would observe human
rights and call free elections."
The Court found no evidence that the United States had pro-
vided direct combat support to the Contras. However, there was evi-
dence that United States support for the activities of the Contras
had taken various forms over the years, including logistical support,
the supplying of information, and loaning of sophisticated communi-
cation devices. 4 With respect to Nicaragua, the Court found that
the evidence was insufficient to show that the government of Nicara-
gua was responsible for any flow of arms into other parts of Central
America."5
The international legal principles of the non-use of force and
non-intervention were next considered by the Court in light of its
factual findings. According to the Court, the laying of mines and
attacks on Nicaraguan ports, and the arming and training of the
Contras, violated the prohibition on the use of force as set forth in
the United Nations Charter.70 Further, the Court rejected a United
States claim that the force was perpetuated in self-defense, stating
that there was insufficient evidence to show that Nicaragua was en-
gaged in an armed attack against El Salvador, Honduras, or Costa
Rica.77 Also, according to the Court's reasoning, the support given
by the United States to the military and paramilitary activities of
the Contras in Nicaragua, through "financial support, training, sup-
ply of weapons, intelligence and logistic support," constituted a vio-
lation of the law of non-intervention, which gives a sovereign the
right to conduct its internal affairs without outside interference. 78
The United States contention that its countermeasures were war-
ranted in response to Nicaragua's 1979 commitments to "secure
70. Id. at 146.
71. Id. at 147.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 147-48.
74. Id. at 146.
75. Id. at 147.
76. Id. at 148-49. See U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
77. Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J.Y.B. at 152.
78. Id. The Court stated, "it [is] clearly established that the United States intended, by
its support of the contras to coerce Nicaragua in respect of matters in which each State is
permitted to decide freely ... ." Id.
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peace" by granting human rights and calling for free elections, was
rejected by the Court. The Court stated that it could not "contem-
plate the creation of a new rule opening up a right of intervention by
one state against another on the ground that the latter has opted for
some particular ideology or political system." 9 The Court concluded
that the United States owed reparations to the government of Nica-
ragua with the specific figures to be worked out subsequently. 0
2. Political Causes and Effects of Nicaragua v. United
States.-Practically speaking, the result of the Nicaragua decision
was that Contra funding was deemed illegal by the International
Court of Justice. However, the political ramifications of the Nicara-
gua decision render the effects unclear.
The importance of the Central American region to the United
States is reflected in the United States reaction to the suit brought
by Nicaragua. The State Department, upon realizing that the
United States was being sued by Nicaragua, notified the Court that
it was adding a new reservation on its grants of compulsory jurisdic-
tion to the International Court of Justice. 81 The reservation stated:
"[t]he Court's compulsory jurisdiction 82 shall not apply to the
United States with respect to disputes with any Central American
state or any dispute arising out of, or related to events in Central
America . .".8.3, The United States refused to recognize the
Court's jurisdiction in these cases because it felt that the Court
could not handle cases which involve complex facts that affect
America's global interests.8"
The Nicaragua situation represents a clash between justice and
order as determined by international law, and the United States ac-
tions in furtherance of what it perceives as the "national interest."85
States are not likely to accept international laws or obligations that
hinder the fulfillment of important interests.86 The "reservation,"
79. Id. at 154.
80. Id. at 155.
81. E. HOYT, supra note 38, at 141. See'Franck, Let's Not Abandon the World Court,
N.Y. Times, July 17, 1986, at A23, col. 13. The author states that the World Court's jurisdic-
tion must be "reconciled with America's global interests." Id.; see also Jenkins, World Court
Says U.S. Violates International Law by Aiding Contras, Wash. Post, June 23, 1986, at Al,
col. 5.
82. The United States accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the World Court in 1946.
E. HOYT, supra note 38, at 141.
83. Id.
84. See generally Franck, supra note 81.
85. W. LEVI, LAW AND POLITICS IN THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 52 (1976). See also
Bruce, The United States and the Law of Mankind: Some Inconsistencies in American Obser-
vance of the Rule of Law, in POWER AND LAW (C. Barker ed. 1971).
86. W. LEVI, supra note 85, at 53. The author states: "as soon as states experience legal
commitments as a hindrance in the fulfillment of important national interests, they will seek a
release or escape from them." Id.
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which was utilized by the United States to eliminate the effects of
Nicaragua's suit, is a mechanism to avoid the constrictions of inter-
national obligations."7 Because the United States policy towards Nic-
aragua is the containment of communism and the establishment of a
democratic form of government in the region,88 the United States
sees these national interests as vitally important to its continued exis-
tence as a world power.
The means adopted by the Reagan Administration to achieve
these goals is the Contra force. The Contras are viewed as "fighters
of freedom" in Central America.8 ' As the International Court of
Justice in Nicaragua v. United States noted, however, the United
States had agreed to a peaceful settlement of disputes under the
Contadora negotiations. Thus, the Reagan Administration and
Congress have stated that they are desirous of a peaceful settle-
ment.9 1 The Guatemala Plan represents an attempt to settle the Cen-
tral American disputes through a peaceful means.9 2 However, under
this "peaceful means," one of the Reagan Administration's weapons
- the Contras - is eliminated.' Thus, the Guatemala Plan must
be analyzed to determine if its peaceful means will protect the
United States' interests in the region.
IV. The Guatemala Treaty: Its Chance for Success
The United States is not a signatory to the Guatemala Plan,
and thus is not bound by its terms.94 As a "Third State, ' 95 the
United States possesses neither rights nor obligations under the
Plan.9 6 Therefore, the United States is not bound by the terms of the
87. See J. KIM & J. HOWELL, CONFLICT OF INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS AND STATE
INTERESTS 31-33 (1972), E. COLLINS, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A CHANGING WORLD: CASES,
DOCUMENTS, AND READINGS 288 (1970).
88. See supra notes 44-54 and accompanying text.
89. See SOVIET ASSISTANCE DISPATCH, supra note 42, at 4; N. SERAFINO, supra note 56,
at 1, 2. See also Church, Captain Ahab v. Moby Dick, TIME, Oct. 19, 1987, at 28; Roberts,
Reagan Planning to Seek More Aid for the Contras, N.Y. Times, Aug. 14, 1987, at A8, ol.
5.
90. 1985-1986 I.C.J.Y.B. 137, 155 (1986). The Court stated that it had "already taken
note of the Contadora process, and of the fact that it had been endorsed by . . .the United
States ... [B]oth Parties [United States and Nicaragua] .. .need to co-operate ...in
seeking a definitive and lasting peace in Central America .... " Id. at 155-56.
91. See infra App. B at preamble; 22 U.S.C.A. § 2273 (West Supp. 1985). See also
supra note 46 (Statement of Secretary Schultz). See generally Magnuson, Not Just One Peace
Plan for Nicaragua, But Two, TIME, Aug. 17, 1987, at 14-15.
92. See supra note 37 (Address to Congress by President Oscar Arias).
93. See infra App. A, at § 5.
94. See A. McNAIR, LAW OF TREATIES 309 (1961); see also Kinzer, Nicaragua Peace
Path Has Pitfalls, N.Y. Times, Sept. 25, 1987, at A3, col. 1.
95. See A. McNAIR, supra note 94, at 309; I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 601, 619 (1979); T. ELIAS, THE MODERN LAW OF TREATIES 59 (1974). This
rule is based upon the Roman Law principle pacta terijis nec prosunt, which means that
agreements neither impose obligations nor confer rights upon third states. Id.
96. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, reprinted in E. COLLINS,
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Guatemala Plan unless it agrees to be so bound.97 Only if the parties
to a treaty intend a specific provision to obligate a third state, will
the obligation, if accepted, arise for that State.98
In order for the peace process to be successful in the region, the
Contadora Group recognized that United States support was cru-
cial." The Contadora Group knew the strategic importance of the
area to the United States, and realized that the United States had
become a protagonist in the area by expending money and arms in
support of the insurgent Contra group."' 0 Such realization is evi-
denced by the Contadora Group's attempt to coordinate its twenty-
one objectives with some of the objectives of the United States, in
order to induce the United States support.101 "The U.S. President
will not stand idly by and permit a country as near our borders as
Nicaragua to become a place from which the Soviet Union and its
allies can militarily threaten our friends or our country's national
security."102 The Reagan Administration has stated that it is com-
mitted to a peaceful settlement of disputes, so long as it protects the
United States concerns in the region.103
Within the Reagan-Wright Plan, the United States demon-
strates this commitment to a peaceful settlement of disputes by re-
quiring an immediate cease-fire and a plan of dialogue and partici-
pation among the citizens of Nicaragua.'" Concurrently, the
Reagan-Wright Plan protects the United States interests by requir-
ing, upon a cease-fire, an end to all foreign military aid to the Con-
tras and to the Sandinista Government." 5 The Reagan Administra-
tion has stated that it seeks a peace in Central America that is
lasting and enduring, not cosmetic. 0 Given the importance of the
region in relation to this goal of a lasting democracy, and the pres-
sure that a world power like the United States could exert on a
treaty, the effectiveness of any treaty in Central America necessarily
hinges on how well it addresses the concerns of the United States.10 7
The Guatemala Plan calls on the governments of Central
America to promote a participatory democratic process involving the
supra note 87, at 294-310 (1970). See also T. ELIAS, supra note 95, at 59; Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.129/15 (1986).
97. Vienna Convention On the Law of Treaties, supra note 96, art. 34, para. 1.
98. Id. at art. 35, para. 1.
99. See CONTADORA ISSUE BRIEF, supra note 4, at 3.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. See supra note 46 (Statement of Secretary Schultz).
103. Id.
104. See infra App. B at §§ 1, 4.
105. Id.
106. See CENTRAL AMERICAN ISSUE BRIEF, supra note 25, at 10, LeMoyne, Latin Hope
and Evasion, N.Y. Times, Aug. 10, 1987, at A7, col. 1.; Statement of Secretary Schultz,
supra note 46.
107. See supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
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promotion of social justice and respect for human rights.10 8 The plan
also guarantees political parties the right to participate in decision
making.10 9 The plan requires freedom of the press, the right of asso-
ciation and public assembly, free elections, and a lifting of any state
of emergency. 110 These democratization steps commit the govern-
ment of Nicaragua to sweeping political changes. The effects of
these democratization measures, and the treaty for that matter, will
bear most heavily on Nicaragua, for Nicaragua is the only country
that had a state of emergency in effect at the time of signing, and is
currently repressing some of these basic human rights as a result of
internal unrest."'
A. Nicaraguan Constitution
On January 9, 1987, a Nicaraguan Constitution was signed into
law."' On paper, the Sandinista Constitution grants a great deal of
civil liberties to its citizens. The list of protected rights is sixty-nine
articles long, and includes the right to life, the right to personal free-
dom, the right to free expression, the right to assemble, the right to
strike, the right to privacy, the right to a speedy trial, the right to
habeas corpus, and the right to protections against secret arrest and
arrest without charges." 3 This comprehensive list of rights, however,
does not necessarily mean that these rights are actually enjoyed. Al-
though the constitution states that Nicaragua "is a participatory and
108. See infra App. A at § 1. See generally Kinzer, Costa Rican Chief Warns on Press
Freedom, N.Y. Times, Aug. 12, 1987, at A8, col. 1; Boudreaux, Latins in Accord on Regional
Peace, L.A. Times, Aug. 8, 1987, at 1, col. 6.
109. See infra App. A at § 1. President Ortega warned opposition parties that they were
in danger of going beyond the dissent tolerated by the Sandinista party. LeMoyne, Sandinistas
Warn Opposition Not to Push too Far, N.Y. Times, Dec. 17, 1987, at A10, col. 1. Ortega also
warned the opposition parties that their political rights could be taken away and their property
rights expropriated. Id.
110. See infra App. A at § 3(c). The provision reads, "the Central American Govern-
ment [sic] that have put into effect a state of exception, siege or emergency, shall lift it and
shall put into effect the rule of law with full observance of all constitutional guarantees." Id.
111. See generally supra note 46 (Statement of Secretary Schultz). There has been
some form of state of emergency in effect in Nicaragua since 1982. NICARAGUA ISSUE BRIEF,
supra note 38, at 4. On January 16, 1988, President Daniel Ortega suspended the state of
emergency in Nicaragua, ostensibly as a concession to induce Congress to stop sending aid to
the contras. Sciolino, Reagan Will Seek Contra Arms Aid Despite New Move, N.Y. Times,
Jan. 18, 1988, at Al, col. 6; LeMoyne, High Stakes in Nicaragua, N.Y. Times, Jan. 18, 1988,
at Al, col. 5. Aid was suspended February 3, 1988. See LeMoyne, supra note 56.
112. NICARAGUA ISSUE BRIEF, supra note 38, at 4. OFFICE OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY FOR
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PUB. No. 9523, THE SANDINISTA
CONSTITUTION (1987) [hereinafter SANDINISTA CONST.].
When a treaty seeks to democratize a nation by making internal political changes, it is
important to analyze the constitution, a government's framework, to determine if the political
structure is capable of guaranteeing a lasting democratic structure. This analysis is especially
important in a situation where a treaty legitimizes a government, as the Guatemala Treaty
does to the Sandinista government. Id. at 9.
113. SANDINISTA CONST., supra note 112, app. A at arts. 1-69. For a general discussion,
see id. at 1-15.
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representative government,"'1 " the provisions of the constitution pro-
vide for a contrary result. While some of the language sounds in
democratic principles, the Nicaraguan Constitution reveals a state
that is still dominated by totalitarianism.
1. Merging of ruling party with government.--One of the ba-
sic principles of a totalitarian government is the merging of the rul-
ing party with the branches of the state government.11 5 The Nicara-
guan Constitution provides for four branches of government, the
Executive, the Judicial, the Legislature, and the Electoral."' All of
the branches of government are subject "to the overriding national
interest,"'' 17 thereby relegating the government branches to the rul-
ing party.
a. Executive Branch.-The constitution sets forth the duties of the
Executive Branch which is dominated by the President of the Re-
public." 8 The constitution delegates broad powers to the President
that help insure his party's dominance. The functions of the Presi-
dent include the power to enact, in fiscal and administrative matters,
legally enforceable executive decrees; the preparation of the budget;
the removal and appointment of ministers; the power to declare a
state of emergency; the administration of the economy and "determi-
nation of socio-economic policies and programs;" and the power to
select candidates to the National Assembly (Legislature), the Su-
preme Court of Justice, the Supreme Electoral Council, and the
Controller of the Republic.119 The President also determines the
"number, organization, and jurisdiction" of the government minis-
114. Id. at app. A art. 7. Article 7 reads: "Nicaragua is a participatory and representa-
tive democratic republic." Id.
115. See L. SCHAPIRO, TOTALITARIANISM 18-20 (1972). The author notes that a com-
mon factor of totalitarian societies is "a single mass party usually led by one man, organized
hierarchically and either superior to or intertwined with the state bureaucracy ...." Id. at
18 (citing C. FRIEDRICH, THE UNIQUE CHARACTER IN TOTALITARIAN SOCIETY (1954)). He
then lists five other characteristics of a totalitarian state: "an official ideology, to which every-
one is supposed to adhere; a near complete monopoly ...over all means of effective mass
communication [and weapons]; ...a system of physical or psychological terroristic police
control;" and central control of the entire economy. Id.
116. SANDINISTA CONST., supra note 112, app. A at chs. II, III, IV, & V.
117. Id. at art. 129. Article 129 states that the "branches of government are indepen-
dent of one another and coordinate harmoniously, subject only to the overriding national inter-
est .... " Id. This "national interest" undoubtedly refers to the state, which is controlled by
the Sandinistas. Id. at 9.
118. Id. at ch. III, arts. 144-53.
119. Id. at art. 150. Article 150(9) states that one of the functions of the President of
the Republic is to "[d]ecree and put into effect the State of Emergency in circumstances
defined by the Political Constitution and forward the decree to the National Assembly for
ratification within a period of no more than forty-five days." Article 150(13) states that a
function of the President is to "[a]dminister the economy of the country and determine the
socio-economic policies and programs." Article 150(14) states that the President has the power
to "[piropose slates of three candidates" for the other branches of government. Id.
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tries120 and state institutions. 21
b. Judicial Branch.-The traditional functions of the Nicaraguan
Supreme Court of Justice include the administration of justice and
appellate review. Significantly, the right to a jury trial is nowhere
guaranteed.1 22 More importantly, the President of the Republic
selects at least three of the seven justices that sit on the court.12
Because the Sandinista party is in control of the presidency, the op-
portunity for abuse in the judicial selection process is inevitable.12
c. Legislative Branch - National Assembly. 2 -The constitution
further outlines the functions of the legislature, yet indicates that the
National Assembly is subordinate to the executive."2 The functions
of the National Assembly, among others, are to draft laws and de-
crees, officially interpret the law, decree amnesty and pardons, ap-
prove the budget, ratify or reject international treaties, and delegate
the legislative power to the President when the Assembly is in re-
cess.127 More specifically, the National Assembly is to "consider" the
nation's economic and social development plans and policies. 128 How-
ever, these economic and social policies are established by the Presi-
dent; the Legislature is permitted to only "consider" them, not
amend or repeal them.
d. Electoral Branch.-The functions of the Electoral Branch, are
to organize and conduct the elections, establish a calendar of elec-
tions, and make a final count of votes. 29 The Electoral Branch is
composed of the "Supreme Electoral Council," which consists of five
members, three of which are nominated by the President. 30 This af-
fords the President and his party, as is the case in judicial nomina-
tions, an opportunity to "stack the deck" in their favor.
In sum, the four branches of government are theoretically inde-
pendent. But the Constitution lacks any checks or balances on abuse
120. The term "ministries" refers to the governmental units and agencies of Nicaraguan
Government. See generally id. at 2-15.
121. SANDINISTA CONST., supra note 112, at art. 151.
122. Id. at ch. V, arts. 158-67.
123. Id. at art. 163. Article 163 states that "[t]he Supreme Court of Justice shall be
composed of at least seven justices selected by the National Assembly, from slates of three
candidates proposed by the President of the Republic." Id.
124. SANDINISTA CONST., supra note 112, at 12.
125. The "National Assembly" is the Nicaraguan Legislature.
126. SANDINISTA CONST., supra note 112, at art. 138. See also id. at 11.
127. SANDINISTA CONST., supra note 112, at art. 138.
128. Id. at art. 138(21). This section provides that one of the functions of the legislative
branch is to "consider the nation's economic and social development plans and policies." Id.
129. Id. at ch. VI, arts. 168-74.
130. Id. at art. 170. Article 170 reads in pertinent part: "The Supreme Electoral Coun-
cil is . . . elected by the National Assembly from slates of three candidates for each position
proposed by the President of the Republic." Id.
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of power by any one branch. In reality, the Constitution gives almost
unbridled power to the executive branch. This grant of power en-
ables the President to dominate all forms of government and the peo-
ple, thereby quelling any opposition and ensuring that the Constitu-
tion is democratic in theory only.
2. Subordination of individual to state.-A hallmark of a to-
talitarian state is the subordination of the individual to the state, and
the concomitant power of the state to take control over economic,
political, educational, and social rights and institutions. s' The
Sandinista Constitution reflects the subordination of the individual to
the Sandinista State.
3. Individual Rights.-As stated earlier, the Sandinista Con-
stitution purports to grant many democratic rights. However, be-
cause the Sandinista party, through the power of the executive,
dominates all branches of government, it can restrict the rights and
liberties of those who challenge its authority. Most significantly, the
constitution affords the President of Nicaragua the greatest opportu-
nity to restrict these rights - the power to declare a state of emer-
gency." 2 The most recent state of emergency, put in place only
hours after the signing of the constitution, was justified because of
the "external enemy.""' There were indications that the state of
emergency was implanted in response to the outward discontent by
the opposition to the signing of the constitution."'
Aside from the state of emergency power of the president, the
language of the constitution itself, curtails individual rights. The
constitution states that "the rights of each person are limited by the
rights of others, the collective security and the just requirements of
the common good." 1 5 Moreover, citizens only enjoy the ambiguous
right to make "constructive criticisms" to the branches of govern-
ment." 6 No doubt it is the Government that decides what is
"constructive."
The subordination of the individual to the needs of the state is
similarly reflected in the constitutional provisions regarding labor,
property, and education rights. "Work is a right and social responsi-
131. See L. SCHAPIRO, supra note 115, at 18; A. DALLIN & G. BRESLAUER, POLITICAL
TERROR IN COMMUNIST SYSTEMS 2 (1970). See generally, SANDINISTA CONST., supra note
112, at 8, 9.
132. See supra note 119.
133. SANDINISTA CONST., supra note 112, at 7.
134. Id. In January 1987, four opposition parties challenged President Ortega's author-
ity to invoke the state of emergency, but Sandinista control of the judiciary ruined their
success.
135. SANDINISTA CONST., supra note 112, at art. 24.
136. Id. at art. 52.
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bility . . . [and] labor is the fundamental means to satisfy the needs
of society. ' 137 Moreover, agrarian reform "is the fundamental instru-
ment for . . . national development and social progress of Nicara-
gua."1"8 Third, private and commercial property "are subject to the
overriding interest of the nation ... .*""9 In another revealing arti-
cle, the goal of education is to prepare Nicaraguans "to assume the
tasks of the common interest necessary for the progress of the na-
tion." 4 Additionally, the constitution uses traditional totalitarian
language in providing that the constitution is meant for "[tihose who
guarantee the happiness of future generations by offering their lives
in the struggle against imperialist aggression."1" In short, all of
these provisions denounce individual rights in favor of a strong na-
tional state.
4. Nicaraguan Ministry of Interior.-Another aspect of a to-
talitarian government is a secret police force that perpetuates the
power of the controlling regime.1, 2 Such a force lies in the Nicara-
guan Ministry of Interior (MINT), which is an arm of the govern-
ment that institutionalizes Sandinista control over Nicaraguan citi-
zens. "1 3 The MINT is used by the Sandinistas as an instrument of
political consolidation,"' and is bureaucratically composed of the
Directorate General for State Security (DGSE).145 The principal
goal of the DGSE is to undercut political opposition. " Opposition is
thwarted by investigations, searches, mass arrests, telephone taps,
and mail openings.1 47 The MINT headquarters the turbas divinas 1 8
that infiltrate and disrupt demonstrations by opposition parties.1 9
One of the MINT's units, the Department of Agitation and Propa-
137. Id. at art. 80.
138. Id. at art. 106.
139. Id. at art. 103.
140. Id. at art. 116.
141. Id. at Preamble.
142. L. SCHAPIRO, supra note 115, at 18; A. DALLIN & G. BRESLAUER, supra note 131,
at 1, 2 ("the linchpin of totalitarianism, political terror," is the "arbitrary use, by organs of
political authority, of severe coercion against individuals or groups, the credible threat of such
use . . . to assume political stability .... "); L. HOLMES, POLITICS IN THE COMMUNIST
WORLD 58 (1986) ("All states [totalitarian] have some apparatus - the police, intelligence
services, etc. - for helping to ensure that citizens abide to the maximum extent by the state
official code of conduct.").
143. BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, NICARAGUAN INTERIOR MINIS-
TRY, PUB. No. 9611 (1987). The MINT has been central to the regime's political control since
the Sandinistas gained power in 1979 and has grown to 15,000 employees. Id. at 1-2.
144. Id. The Soviet Union and her allies helped build and support the Interior Ministry.
Id. at 9.
145. Id. at 4.
146. Id. at 3.
147. Id. at 7.
148. Turbas divinas is translated to "divine mobs."
149. Id. See also LeMoyne, Latin Peace Plan Said to Be Slowed by Honduran View,
N.Y. Times, Aug. 21, 1987, at A6, col. 9; the police broke up a rally by subduing demonstra-
tors with electric prods. Id.
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ganda, manages propaganda, disinformation, and censorship activi-
ties.150 The MINT also controls the whole penal system.' 5' As the
Sandinistas are determined to maintain their power they attempt to
control the political, social, and economic well being of the Nicara-
guan citizenry through the powerful vehicle of the Interior Ministry.
In sum, the Nicaraguan Constitution and the Sandinista's in-
strument of political control, the Interior Ministry, indicate that
Nicaragua is still a totalitarian state. Thus, the Guatemala Plan
seeks to "democratize" this communist state. To determine if the
Guatemala Plan can successfully change this basically communist
state, and thereby ensure the United States and the rest of the re-
gion that Nicaragua is capable of becoming a democracy, other pro-
visions of the Guatemala Plan must be analyzed.
B. Other Provisions of the Guatemala Plan
The Guatemala Plan charges the five signatories to request the
governments within the region and outside of the region to cease mil-
itary, logistic, financial, manpower, and armament assistance to "ir-
regular or insurrectionist movement . "..52 Thus, under the terms
of the agreement, "irregular" or anti-government forces would no
longer receive funds from foreign governments outside of Central
America. The United States, therefore, would not be permitted to
give to the Contras, an anti-government force, military aid under the
terms of the agreement. 5 s However, the Guatemala Plan is silent on
the issue of Soviet-bloc aid to the Sandinista Government.' 5 The
Sandinista Government, therefore, can legally continue to receive the
same amount of Soviet military aid under this Plan. One of the roles
of the United States-backed Contras is to exert pressure on the
Sandinistas to negotiate seriously.' 5 If the Contra aid is halted, but
the Soviet aid continues, the Sandinistas will no longer be pressured
150. U.S. Dept. of State, Nicaraguan Interior Ministry, supra note 143 at 4.
151. Id. at 5.
152. Guatemala Plan, supra note 5, at § 5, see infra App. A.
153. Humanitarian aid, such as food, clothing, medical supplies, could still be provided.
See U.S. Assistance Issue Brief, supra note 55, at 5. Although a recent four month aid pack-
age was rejected by Congress in February 1988, there are indications that the Contras have
sufficient supplies to last for several months. LeMoyne, Contra Leaders Assail House Vote;
Vow to Press On, N.Y. Times, Feb. 5, 1988, at Al, col. 1. Congress is expected to approve a
humanitarian aid package for the Contras in late February, early March. Id. The Contras
have additionally set up a tax deductible fund for aid in the United States. See LeMoyne,
N.Y. Times, Feb. 9, 1988, at AI0, col. 1. If the Sandinistas do not appear to be complying
with the regional treaty, the Contras will ask the United States Administration to again seek
aid for them. LeMoyne, Contra Leaders Assail House Vote; Vow to Press On, N.Y. Times,
Feb. 5, 1988, at Al, col. 1. See also Brinkley, N.Y. Times, Jan. 27, 1988, at Al, col. 6.
154. The Sandinista military force is the government force, and not an "irregular" or
"insurgent" force, so it thereby is not excluded from outside military aid. See Hoffman, Rea-
gan Says Arms Plan Insufficient, Wash. Post, Oct. 8, 1987, at Al, col. 1.
155. See supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
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by the Contras. Thus, the fact that the Soviet Union is permitted to
continue to send military aid to Nicaragua, but the United States
would be prevented from funding the Contras, the United States
government is naturally opposed to the plan. The Reagan Adminis-
tration is concerned about Soviet expansionism and the resultant
spread of communism; 56 this spread of communism would be facili-
tated under the terms of the Guatemala Plan, because Nicaragua
would be at full military strength, while the Contras would be
defenseless.
1. Lack of Sanctions or Enforcement Measures.-The Guate-
mala Plan contains no sanctions or enforcement mechanisms against
any government which does not continue to comply with the terms of
the agreement. 5' The plan commits Nicaragua to a series of democ-
ratization measures. While the plan provides for the establishment of
an "International Commission for Verification and Follow-up" to
verify compliance with the terms of the plan, 58 it does not provide
for punishments if a party does not comply.'5 9 The United States
desires a lasting democracy in Nicaragua,'60 yet it is unlikely this
will happen unless sanctions exist. Nicaragua has agreed to make
democratic reforms, but there is no way to ensure that these reforms
will be complied with in the future. if punishment measures were
taken upon noncompliance, this would give the Sandinistas impetus
to reform.
2. Legitimization of Sandinista Rule.-The Guatemala Plan
attempts to secure peace in Central America through an implemen-
tation of democratic reforms. In many instances, however, the plan
legitimizes the communist political system of Nicaragua under
Sandinista rule.' 6' The continued allowance of Soviet-bloc aid af-
firms this conclusion. The Guatemala Plan states that future elec-
tions will be held according to the schedules mandated by each coun-
try's respective constitutions. 62 Although the elections will be
156. Statement of Secretary Schultz, supra note 46.
157. Sciolino, Latin Peace Plan is Said to Set Back Help to Contras, N.Y. Times, Aug.
11, 1987, at Al, col. I ("provides no sanctions for non-compliance").
158. Guatemala Plan, supra note 5, § 10, infra App. A. Three of four members of the
National Commission assigned to monitor Nicaragua's compliance with the terms of the Gua-
temala treaty, said Nicaragua failed to meet its obligations. Kinzer, Peace Monitors Criticize
Sandinistas, N.Y. Times, Jan. 11, 1988, at Al, col. 4.
159. The commissions are appointed by the respective governments and there is some
concern that Nicaragua has placed Sandinista supporters on them. See N.Y. Times, Aug. 26,
1987, at A3, col. 1.
160. See supra note 54.
161. See CENTRAL AMERICAN ISSUE BRIEF, supra note 25, at 3; LeMoyne, Latin Hope
and Evasion, N.Y. Times, Aug. 10, 1987, at A2, col. 5; Portland Press Herald, Aug. 11, 1987,
at 6 (editorial).
162. Guatemala Plan, supra note 5, at § 4, infra App. A.
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monitored by international bodies, 163 the provisions still allow the
current government's totalitarian laws to dictate.
3. Direct Talks with the Contras/Cease-Fire.-The Guate-
mala Plan provides for a series of steps toward national reconcilia-
tion. The goal is to integrate opposition groups and guerrilla forces
into democratic, political processes. 16 4 Under the plan it is "strongly
urged" that each country achieve a cease-fire with armed opposition
groups.165 The Nicaraguan Government and the Contras recently
met face to face and negotiated a temporary cease-fire. 6' The fact
that the two sides met and discussed a cease-fire demonstrates the
two factions' willingness to abide by that portion of the Guatemala
Plan. There is some indication, however, that the Contras agreed to
this cease-fire because they felt abandoned by the United States, af-
ter three aid packages were defeated in Congress.6 7 Humanitarian
aid has since been renewed, and will assuredly give the Contras more
bargaining power, thus enabling the Contras to press the Sandinista
Government to make more fundamental democratic changes.1 68 One
of the United States' purposes of funding the Contras is to compel
the Sandinistas to negotiate seriously.6 9 The Guatemala Plan sets
out the aspirational framework for cease-fire negotiations. Face to
face negotiations are critical to the success of a prolonged cease-fire
in Nicaragua, but the negotiations must produce a "democratiza-
tion" within the spirit of the Guatemala Plan, and within the goals
of the United States and the Contras. If the Sandinista Government
refuses to make the called for internal political changes, the chances
for a lasting cease-fire are bleak, at best.
4. Nicaragua's Intentions - Democracy?-The Guatemala
Plan permits the Sandinista Government to continue receiving aid
from the Soviet Union.17 0 The government's motivation for agreeing
to make democratic changes is questionable since it will still receive
163. Id.
164. Id. at § 2. The provision reads, "the governments involved shall initiate a dialogue
with all unarmed internal political opposition groups." Id. (emphasis added).
165. Id.
166. In late January 1988, officials of the Nicaraguan Government and anti-Govern-
ment Contras met face to face for the first time. LeMoyne, Face to Face for Sandinistas and
Rebels, N.Y. Times, Jan. 29, 1988, at A3, col. 4. The Nicaraguan Government has focused
negotiations on the technical aspects of achieving a cease-fire, but refuses to discuss internal
political matters. LeMoyne, A Wide Gap for Sandinistas and Rebels, N.Y. Times, Jan. 30,
1988, at A3, col. 4. The Sandinistas refuse to talk about rewriting the constitution or sus-
pending Soviet military aid. LeMoyne, Face to Face for Sandinistas and Rebels, N.Y. Times,
Jan. 29, 1988, at A3, col. 4.
167. Kinzer, Motives for Truce, N.Y. Times, Mar. 26, 1988, at Al, col. 3.
168. See supra note 55, at 5 and accompanying text.
169. See supra note 60.
170. See supra note 154.
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the same amount of economic and military aid from the Soviet
Union. As a possible explanation, there is some indication that the
Soviet Union will not support the Sandinista Government to the
same extent as in previous years. Recently, the Soviet Union, which
had provided Nicaragua with nearly all the crude oil it consumes,
stopped supplying the same amounts of oil.' 7 ' The economy of Nica-
ragua, in general, has been severely mismanaged and is in a disas-
trous condition. 1 2 The United States has exacerbated the situation
through economic sanctions, reductions of quotas, and bank loan cut-
offs.1 73 This economic crisis, further affected by war, may cause Nic-
aragua to view democracy and the resultant United States support as
a way out. 17" This is evidenced by indications that Nicaragua has
already implemented some of the reforms called for by the Guate-
mala Plan.1
7 5
V. Irreconcilable Differences?: Recommendations for an Effective
Central American Treaty
The Guatemala Plan is a good starting point for peace, but is,
unfortunately, crippled by a lack of specificity, and an absence of
respect for the national concerns of the United States. 7 6 To be effec-
tive, a treaty in this region must define a democracy in a way that
ensures a genuineness of political structural change. In this way, the
Reagan-Wright Plan offers some solutions.
A. Elimination of all Foreign Military Aid
The Reagan-Wright Plan calls for the suspension of all military
aid to the Contras, and simultaneously, the suspension of all military
aid from Cuba, the Soviet Union, and all Communist-bloc countries
to Nicaragua. The suspension of Soviet military aid, as well as
Contra aid, is crucial for the implementation of a lasting democracy
171. Kinzer, For Nicaragua Soviet Frugality Starts to Pinch, N.Y. Times, Aug. 20,
1987, at Al, col. 5. See also NICARAGUAN ISSUE BRIEF, supra note 38, at 5.
172. Kinzer, supra note 171, at Al, col. 5. Nicaragua is heavily dependent on foreign
aid and its economy has been disrupted by inefficiency, American pressure, and the burden of
a war that consumes more than half its budget. Id. See Nordland, Managua's Wounded Econ-
omy, NEWSWEEK, June 22, 1987, at 35 ("The Sandinistas were guerrillas not M.B.A.'s").
173. See NICARAGUA ISSUE BRIEF, supra note 38, at 6.
174. The Reagan-Wright Plan calls for the renewal of economic aid to Nicaragua if it
democratizes. See Reagan-Wright Plan, supra note 25.
175. President Ortega announced that two exiled Roman Catholic prelates and a priest
would be allowed to return to Nicaragua; on September 19, 1987 the opposition newspaper La
Prensa was allowed to reopen; and the Sandinista Government formed the National Reconcili-
ation Commission as called for under the plan. Central American Issue Brief, supra note 25,
at 7, 9. In late January 1988, new radio programs and new magazines, both predominantly
anti-Sandinista were permitted to operate. Kinzer, Sandinistas Feel Sting of an Unshackled
Press, N.Y. Times, Jan. 28, 1988, at A4, col. 5.
176. CENTRAL AMERICAN ISSUE BRIEF, supra note 25, at 2.
177. See Reagan-Wright Plan, supra note 25, at proposal 1, infra App. B.
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in Nicaragua. The Reagan-Wright Plan thus represents a better
peaceful settlement of disputes predicated on the removal of external
military aid.
B. Contingency Plan - Reform Chart
The Reagan-Wright Plan provides that the removal of outside
military aid is contingent on the success of Nicaragua in effectuating
democratic reforms.1" 8 Under the plan, the Contras continue to re-
ceive military aid until the reforms are implemented, and compliance
is required within six weeks."79 This is an unrealistic timetable, for
the reforms that are needed go deep into the political infrastructure
of the Sandinista Government. The Sandinistas have had some form
of a communist state since 1979,180 and if they are willing to became
a true democracy, they should be given a realistic chance under a
realistic timetable.
Ideally, the reforms that are needed should be set out on a one
year reform chart. Basic reforms that are somewhat easier to initi-
ate, such as a free press, free speech, free elections, would be charted
at the two month period. More difficult changes, such as amnesty
and open dialogue would be charted around the four to six month
period. Halfway, at the six month period, and contingent on the ini-
tiation of the reforms charted before this time, a cease-fire should be
negotiated between the Sandinistas and the Contras. 8'
The very definition of a democratic political system requires
participation by all parties. The Contras have a stake in the develop-
ment of Nicaragua, and should be included in its processes leading
to development. Up until this six month period, the Contras should
remain funded in order to compel the Sandinistas to negotiate seri-
ously and to monitor compliance. After the sixth month passes, and
assuming all prior reforms have been initiated, then all United
States and Soviet-bloc aid, save humanitarian aid, should be halted.
At this six month juncture, the second half of the year's appropria-
tions less humanitarian aid, should be placed in an escrow ac-
count. 8 This will assure the Sandinistas that if they do not comply,
the Contras will be re-funded. After each reform that is listed in the
178. Id. at proposal 6.
179. Id. at proposal 6. The plan was proposed on August 5, 1987, and the requirements
were to take place by September 30, 1987.
180. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
181. The Contras have indicated that the International Red Cross could represent them
in negotiations. N.Y. Times, Aug. 10, 1987, at A7, col. 4. Now that the two parties have
agreed to negotiate one on one the negotiations must be serious and fundamental, not
superficial.
182. The Contras have previously asked the Reagan Administration for an escrow ac-
count. Brinkley, Nicaraguan Contras Ask Reagan for Escrow Fund Linked to Talks, N.Y.
Times, Aug. 28, 1987, at Al, col. 4.
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second stage of reforms, i.e., after six months, the escrow account
will be incrementally decreased. The funds that are taken from the
account should be used to start another account, one that would re-
present monies to be used for the future joint development of
Nicaragua. 83
C. Internal-Political Changes
The second stage of the reform chart, six months and on, will
seek to reform the political structure of the Sandinista Govern-
ment."" As the United States is interested in a stable, lasting de-
mocracy, in Nicaragua, Nicaragua's political structure, conse-
quently, must be changed.
The Sandinista Constitution purports to grant individual free-
doms and at the same time takes them away. The individual is su-
perseded by the state interest, mainly by the oppressive workings of
the Interior Ministry (MINT). It is these internal totalitarian struc-
tures that must be changed in order to bring a real democracy to
Nicaragua. The Guatemala Plan's calling for an end to any state of
emergencies is insufficient to meet this goal. A treaty in this region
must go further, and change a political system that could give a gov-
ernment this power. The second half of the reform chart should deal
with these internal political structures. In order for a true guarantee
of rights to exist, an amendment of the constitution must be initi-
ated '8 that would abolish any means of eliminating these rights, and
eradicate any tools for political consolidation and suppression.
D. Compliance Measures
One of the Reagan Administration's greatest concerns regard-
ing this plan, is that the treaty must institute a democracy that is
stable and lasting, and not "cosmetic."'"" The Guatemala Plan states
that reconciliation commissions are responsible for verification and
follow-up on the provisions, but does not define their verification
powers or guidelines for determining compliance. A treaty must pro-
vide properly structured and empowered organizations to verify the
183. This may be to Nicaragua's advantage, given its current economic situations. See
generally, supra notes 171 and 172.
184. But see LeMoyne, Sandinistas and Rebels Differ Sharply on Proposal, N.Y.
Times, Aug. 7, 1987, at AI0, col. 3. "We do not believe that internal affairs ought to be the
subject of international agreement, otherwise we would have to submit our own ideas on how
to make the United States more democratic." (Nicaraguan Foreign Minister d'Escoto
Brockmann interpreting President Ortega.) Id.
185. Fourteen opposition groups within Nicaragua have recently appealed for changes in
the Nicaraguan Constitution. Kinzer, Contra Leaders Assail House Vote; Vow to Press On,
N.Y. Times, Feb. 5, 1988 at A6, col. 4. President Ortega responded by stating that the Consti-
tution could not be amended lightly. Id.
186. See Statement of Secretary Schultz, supra note 46.
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provisions, and also outline the rights and responsibilities of the ver-
ification organizations.'87 A properly constructed verification mecha-
nism would ensure that Nicaragua is not merely promising reform,
but is actually committed to democracy. A reform chart that plots
out the different reforms and their various proposed target dates
would provide an adequate checklist for determining compliance. In-
dependent organizations, such as the Organization of American
States 18 and the International Red Cross, 189 could ensure that Nica-
ragua has met all stages, and could provide assistance and guidance
in implementing the reforms, amending the constitution and disman-
tling the pervasive Interior Ministry.
In sum, for any plan to have a realistic chance to bring about
peace in Central America, it must establish reforms over a period of
time so that a gradual transition from communism to democracy can
occur. In order to be effective, a treaty that focuses on the guarantee
of fundamental rights and the political structures that grant or deny
them, must provide an adequate enforcement mechanism to ensure
true democratization.
VI. Conclusion
President Reagan has stated that the Guatemala Plan is insuffi-
cient because it does not meet the concerns of the United States. 90
The Central American region is vitally important to the United
States interests in restricting Soviet expansion. The major flaw that
plagues the Guatemala Plan from the United States' viewpoint is
that it would dismantle the Contras while enabling Nicaragua to
continue to receive Soviet-bloc military aid. As purported, the goal
of the United States is the achievement of a lasting democracy for
Nicaragua. A treaty which cannot produce this result is unaccept-
able. Because, in reality international obligations are at times legiti-
mately superseded by the interests of an outside powerful state, trea-
ties must take foreign national interests into account. To gain a true
democracy in Nicaragua, a better treaty effort would need to provide
a more realistic timetable, adequate security and compliance mea-
sures, and a series of internal reform mechanisms that would change
the political structure of the nation. Although Nicaraguan President
Ortega has stated that international obligations cannot dictate the
way a state is politically organized, by signing the Guatemala Plan,
however, he has agreed to democratic political changes. Any pro-
187. See U.S. ASSISTANCE BRIEF, supra note 55, at 9.
188. Guatemala Plan, supra note 5, at § 10.
189. See supra note 181.
190. Hoffman, Reagan Says Arms Plan Insufficient, Wash. Post, Oct. 8, 1987, at Al,
col. 1.
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posed treaty, to be effective, must not only receive unconditional and
wide-based support but also ensure that these changes are actually
instituted.
R. Karl Hill
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APPENDIX A
TEXT OF AGREEMENTS BY THE PRESIDENTS OF CENTRAL AMERICA
(Un-official Translation)
PREAMBLE
The Presidents of the Republics of Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua and
Costa Rica, meeting in Guatemala City on August 6-7, 1987, encouraged by the farsighted
and steadfast desire for peace of the Contadora and the Support Groups, strengthened by the
firm support of all the governments and peoples of the world, and their principal international
organizations-particularly the European Economic Community and His Holiness John Paul
II-based on the Declaration of Esquipulas I, and coming together in Guatemala to discuss
the peace plan presented by the Government of Costa Rica, have decided:
To face fully the historic challenge of forging a peaceful future for Central- America,
To undertake the commitment to fight for peace and eliminate war,
To make dialogue prevail over violence, and reason over rancor,
To dedicate these efforts for peace to the youth of Central America, whose legitimate
aspirations for peace, social justice, freedom and reconciliation have been frustrated for many
generations,
To make the Central American Parliament a symbol for the freedom, independence and
reconciliation to which Central America aspires.
We ask for respect and assistance from the international community for our efforts,
We have Central American avenues for peace and development, but we need help to make
them effective. We ask for an international treatment that will ensure development so that the
peace we seek will be lasting,
We repeat firmly that peace and development are inseparable.
We thank President Vinicio Cerezo Arevalo and the noble people of Guatemala for host-
ing this meeting,
The generosity of the President and the people of Guatemala were decisive elements in
creating the climate in which the peace agreements were adopted.
PROCEDURE FOR ESTABLISHING FIRM AND LASTING PEACE IN CENTRAL
AMERICA
The governments of the Republics of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and
Nicaragua, determined to achieve the objectives and to develop the principles established in
the Charter of the United Nations, the Charter of the Organization of American States, the
Document of Objectives, the Message of Caraballeda for Peace, Security and Democracy in
Central America, the Declaration of Guatemala, the Communique of Punta del Este, the Mes-
sage of Panama, the Declaration of Esquipulas, and the draft Contadora Act for Peace and
Cooperation in Central America of June 6, 1986, have agreed on the following procedure to
establish firm and lasting peace in Central America.
1. NATIONAL RECONCILIATION
A. Dialogue
To undertake on an urgent basis, in those cases where deep divisions have occurred in
society, actions for national reconciliation that will permit the participation of the people, with
full guarantees in genuine democratic political processes, on the basis of justice freedom and
democracy, and to that end, to establish mechanisms that will make dialogue with opposing
groups possible under the law.
For this purpose, the governments involved shall initiate a dialogue with all unarmed in-
ternal political opposition groups and with those that have availed themselves of amnesty.
B. Amnesty
In each Central American country, except those where the International Commission for
Verification and Follow-up determines that it is not necessary, decrees for amnesty shall be
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issued that will establish all of the provisions to ensure inviolability of life, freedom in all of its
forms, material property and safety of the persons to whom those decrees are applicable. Si-
multaneously with the issuance of the amnesty decrees, the irregular forces of the country
concerned shall release all prisoners under their control.
C. National Commission of Reconciliation
To verify compliance with the commitments that the five Central American Governments
undertake by signing this document, regarding amnesty, cease-fire, democratization and free
elections, a National Commission of Reconciliation shall be established that will have the du-
ties of verifying the actual carrying out of the national reconciliation process, and the un-
restricted respect for all the civil and political rights of Central American citizens that are
guaranteed in this document.
The National Commission of Reconciliation shall be composed of a principal and alter-
nate delegate representing the Executive Branch, a principal and alternate delegate suggested
by the Episcopal Conference and selected by the Government from a panel of three bishops to
be submitted within fifteen days after receipt of the formal invitation. This invitation shall be
issued by the governments within five working days following the signature of this document.
The same procedure using a panel of three shall be employed to select a principal and alterna-
tive representative of the legally-registered political opposition parties. The panel of three shall
be submitted by the same deadline mentioned above. Each Central American Government
shall also select as a member of that committee an outstanding citizen and an alternate for
him who are not members either of the government or of the government's party. The decision
or decree establishing the National Commission shall be reported immediately to the other
Central American governments.
2. EXHORTATION FOR THE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES
The governments strongly urge the countries in the area that are now undergoing attacks
by irregular or insurgent groups to agree to ceasing hostilities. The governments of those coun-
tries undertake to carry out all actions required to achieve an effective cease-fire under the
constitutional framework.
3. DEMOCRATIZATION
The governments commit themselves to promote an authentic participatory and pluralistic
democratic process involving promotion of social justice, respect for human rights, sovereignty,
territorial integrity of the States, and the right of all nations to determine freely and without
outside interference of any kind their economic, political and social models, and they shall take
in a verifiable manner measures that are conducive to the establishment, and where necessary,
the improvement of democratic, representative and pluralistic systems that guarantee the or-
ganization of political parties and effective participation of the people in decision-making and
that ensure free access of different currents of opinion to honest periodic elections, based on
the full observance of the rights of citizens.
In order to verify the good faith in the carrying out of this process of democratization, it
shall be understood that:
A. There shall be freedom of the press, radio and television. This complete freedom shall
include opening and keeping in operation mass media communications for all ideological
groups and operating those media without subjecting them to prior censorship.
B. There shall be total pluralism of political parties. In this regard, political groups shall
have full access to the mass media, shall enjoy fully the right of association and the right of
public assembly in the unrestricted exercise of oral, written and televised publicity, as well as
freedom of movement for the members of political parties in their efforts to proselytize.
C. In addition, the Central American Government that have put in effect a state of excep-
tion, siege or emergency, shall lift it and shall put into effect the rule of law with full obser-
vance of all constitutional guarantees.
4. FREE ELECTIONS
Having established the conditions inherent in any democracy, there shall be free, pluralis-
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tic and honest elections.
As a joint expression of the Central American countries to find reconciliation and lasting
peace for their peoples, elections shall be held to select members of the Central American
Parliament, whose establishment was proposed by the "Declaration of Esquipulas" of May 25,
1986.
For the above purposes, the Presidents expressed their resolve to proceed in organizing
this Parliament, for which purpose the Preparatory Commission of the Central American Par-
liament shall conclude its deliberations and submit to the Central American Presidents the
respective Draft Treaty within 150 days.
These elections shall be held simultaneously in all the countries of Central America in the
first half of 1988 on a date that shall be agreed upon at the proper time by the Presidents of
the Central American States. The elections shall be monitored by the appropriate electoral
bodies, and the governments concerned commit themselves to extend invitations to the Organi-
zation of American States, the United Nations, and the Governments of third states to send
observers who shall verify that the electoral processes have been carried out in accordance with
the strictest rules of equal access for all political parties to the social communication media,
and to ample facilities to hold public meetings and to conduct any other kind of proselytizing
propaganda.
So that the elections for members of the Central American Parliament are held within the
period indicated in this section, the constituent treaty shall be submitted to the five countries
for approval or ratification.
After the elections for the Central American Parliament are held, there shall take place in
each country, with international observers and the same guarantees, within the deadlines set
and the schedules that shall be proposed under the current political constitutions, equally free
and democratic elections to select people's representatives in the municipalities, congresses and
legislative assemblies, and the Presidency of the Republic.
5. CESSATION OF ASSISTANCE TO IRREGULAR FORCES OR TO
INSURRECTIONAL MOVEMENTS
The Governments of the five Central American States shall request the Government in
the region and the governments outside the region that overtly, or covertly provide assistance,
be it military, logistic, financial, propagandist, in manpower, armament, munitions, and equip-
ment to irregular forces or insurrectionist movements, to cease such assistance, as an indispen-
sable element for achieving stable and durable peace in the region.
Not included in the foregoing is assistance for repatriation, or in its place, relocation and
the assistance necessary for the return to normal life of those persons who were members of
such groups or forces. In addition, irregular forces and insurgent groups operating in Central
American shall be requested to to refrain from receiving such assistance, for the sake of an
authentic Latin American spirit. These requests shall be made pursuant to the provisions of
the Document of Objectives regarding the elimination of the traffic in arms, whether within
the region or from outside the region, intended for persons, organizations or groups that at-
tempt to destabilize the governments of the Central American countries.
6. NON-USE OF TERRITORY FOR AGGRESSION AGAINST OTHER STATES
The five countries signing this document reiterate their commitment to deny the use of
their own territory to, and not to provide or permit logistic military support for persons, orga-
nizations or groups that seek to destabilize the governments of the Central American
countries.
7. NEGOTIATION OF MATTERS OF SECURITY, VERIFICATION AND
LIMITATIONS OF ARMAMENTS
The Governments of the five Central American States with the participation of the Con-
tadora Group, in the exercise of its role as mediator, shall continue negotiations on points still
pending of agreement regarding matters of security, verification and control in the Draft Act
of Contadora for Peace and Cooperation in Central America.
These negotiations shall also cover measures for the disarmament of the irregular forces
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that are ready to avail themselves of the amnesty decrees.
8. REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS
The Central American Governments commit themselves to provide urgent relief to the
flows of refugees or displaced persons that the regional crisis has brought about, by furnishing
protection and assistance particularly in areas of health, education, employment and security,
and to facilitate their repatriation, resettlement or relocation, provided that it is voluntary and
is requested individually.
They also commit themselves to seek assistance from the international community for
Central American refugees and displaced persons, both directly under bilateral or multilateral
agreements, and through the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
and other agencies and organizations.
9. COOPERATION, DEMOCRACY AND FREEDOM FOR PEACE AND
DEVELOPMENT
In the climate of freedom that democracy ensures, the Central American countries shall
take decisions to accelerate development in order to achieve societies that are more egalitarian
and free from poverty.
Consolidation of democracy involves the establishment of an economy of well-being and
an economic and social democracy. To achieve these objectives, the governments shall jointly
make arrangements to obtain special economic assistance from the international community.
10. INTERNATIONAL FOLLOW-UP AND VERIFICATION
A. International Commission for Verification and Follow-up
An International Commission for Verification and Follow-up shall be established com-
posed of the Secretary Generals, or their representatives, of the Organization of American
States and the United Nations, and the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Central America, the
Contadora Group and the Support Group. This Commission shall have the duty of verification
and follow-up on compliance with the commitments set forth in this document.
B. Support for and Facilities of the Mechanisms for Reconciliation and for Verification
and Follow-up
In order to strengthen the actions of the International Commission for Verification and
Follow-up, the Governments of the five Central American States shall issue declarations sup-
porting its work. These declarations may be endorsed by any countries interested in promoting
the cause of freedom, democracy and peace in Central America.
The five governments shall provide all the facilities needed for proper performance of the
duties of verification and follow-up by the National Commission of Reconciliation of each
country and the International Commission for Verification and Follow-up.
11. SCHEDULE OF EXECUTION OF AGREEMENTS
Within a period of fifteen days from the signature of this document, the Ministers of
Foreign Affairs of Central America shall meet as an Executive Commission to establish regu-
lations, promote and make viable the implementation of the commitments contained in this
document, and to organize the working committees so that, beginning on that date, the
processes that will lead to compliance with the commitments contracted shall be initiated
within the stipulated deadlines, by means of consultations, negotiations and any other mecha-
nisms deemed necessary.
Within ninety days following the signature of this document, the commitments relating to
amnesty, cease-fire, democratization, cessation of aid to irregular forces or to insurrectional
movements, and the non-use of territory for aggression against other states, as defined in this
document, shall enter into force simultaneously and publicly.
Within one hundred and twenty days following signature of this document, the Interna-
tional Commission for Verification and Follow-up shall review the progress made in complying
with the agreements set forth in this document.
Within one hundred and fifty days, the five Central American presidents shall meet and
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shall receive a report from the International Commission for Verification and Follow-up and
shall make the pertinent decisions.
FINAL PROVISIONS
The points contained in this documents comprise an harmonious and indivisible whole.
The signing of the document involves the obligation, accepted in good faith, of complying
simultaneously with the agreements entered into within the stipulated deadlines.
The Presidents of the five States of Central America, with the political will to respond to
our peoples' desires for peace, sign this document in the City of Guatemala, on the seventh day
of the month of August, nineteen hundred and eighty-seven.
OSCAR ARIAS SANCHEZ
President of the Republic of Costa Rica
JOSE NAPOLEAN DUARTE
Presidente of the Republic of El Salvador
VINICIO CEREZO AREVALO
President of the Republic of Guatemala
JOSE AZCONA HOYO
President of the Republic of Honduras
DANIEL ORTEGA SAAVEDRA
President of the Republic of Nicaragua
APPENDIX B
THE WRIGHT/REAGAN PEACE PLAN
[The Wright/Reagan Peace Plan, also known as the bipartisan peace plan, was a diplomatic
initiative developed jointly by Speaker of the House Jim Wright (D-TX) and President Ron-
ald Reagan.]
Recognizing that the Central American Presidents are about to meet to discuss the issues
involved and seek a peaceful solution to the problems in Central America, the United States
desires to make known its views on certain of the basic elements that need to be included.
With respect to Nicaragua, the United States has three legitimate concerns for the well-
being of the hemisphere:
1. That there be no Soviet, Cuban, or Communist Bloc bases established in Nicaragua
that pose a threat to the United States and the other democratic governments in the
hemisphere.
2. That Nicaragua pose no military threat to its neighbor countries nor provide a staging
ground for subversion or destabilization of duly elected governments in the hemisphere.
3. That the Nicaraguan Government respect the basic human rights of its people, in-
cluding political rights guaranteed in the Nicaraguan Constitution and pledges made to the
OAS [Organization of American States]-free speech, free press, religious liberty, and a regu-
larly established system of free, orderly elections.
Beyond this, the United States has no right to influence or determine the identify of the
political leaders of Nicaragua nor the social and economic system of the country. These are
matters wholly within the right of the Nicaraguan people. The United States affirms its sup-
port for the right of the Nicaraguan people to peaceful, democratic self-determination, free
from outside intervention from any source.
In order to bring an immediate end to hostilities and begin a process of reconciliation, we
propose the following:
1. An immediate cease-fire in place, on terms acceptable to the parties involved, subject
to verification by the OAS or an international group of observers should be negotiated as soon
as possible. When the cease-fire is in place, the United States will immediately suspend all
military aid to the Contras, and, simultaneously, Nicaragua will stop receiving military aid
from Cuba, the Soviet Union, and the Communist Bloc countries. Humanitarian aid can be
supplied to both groups. The emergency law will be immediately suspended, and all civil rights
and liberties will be restored. An agreed, independent multi-party electoral commission will be
established to assure regular elections open to free participation by all. A timetable and proce-
dures for all elections, including those to be supervised and guaranteed by an agreed interna-
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tional body, such as the OAS, will be established within 60 days.
2. The withdrawal of foreign military personnel and advisers from Nicaragua and its
immediate neighbors that are in excess of the normal and legitimate needs of the region will be
subject to negotiations among the countries of the region. The United States will suspend
combat maneuvers in Honduras as a demonstration of good faith when the cease-fire is in
place.
3. After the cease-fire is in place, negotiations among the Governments of the United
States, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua shall begin on reduc-
tions in standing armies in the region, withdrawal of foreign military personnel, restoration of
regional military balance, security guarantees against outside support for insurgent forces, and
verification and enforcement provisions. As part of this negotiation process, the United States
shall enter into discussions with the governments of the region-including the Government of
Nicaragua-concerning security issues. A regional agreement on security issues shall be nego-
tiated within 60 days, unless this period is extended by mutual agreement. The OAS shall be
invited to be signatory to and guarantor of this agreement.
4. A plan of national reconciliation and dialogue among citizens of Nicaragua, including
amnesty for former combatants and equal rights to participation in the political process. There
shall be a plan of demobilization of both Sandinista and Resistance forces. In accordance with
the implementation of this plan, the United States simultaneously shall cease all resupply of
Resistance forces. Both the Government of Nicaragua and the Government of the United
States shall encourage and support the reintegration of demobilized forces into Nicaraguan
civil and political society on terms guaranteeing their safety. Nicaragua shall at this time
become eligible for existing and prospective U.S. assistance programs.
5. A plan of expanded trade and long-range economic assistance for the democratic gov-
ernments of Central America in which Nicaragua might participate. By the process of democ-
ratization and compliance with regional nonaggression agreements, Nicaragua would qualify
for participation in the Caribbean Basin Initiative, and the United States will lift its economic
embargo.
6. The negotiating process shall commence immediately and be completed by September
30, 1987. If the Nicaraguan Resistance, or forces under its command, should refuse to engage
in this negotiating process, willfully obstruct its progress, or violate its terms, the United States
shall immediately suspend all assistance to the Resistance. If because of actions taken by the
Nicaraguan Government or the forces under its command, the negotiating process should not
proceed, or its terms, conditions, and deadlines should not be met, the parties to these under-
takings would be free to pursue such actions as they deem necessary to protect their national
interest.
